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Abstract
In this work we challenge the common misconception that information-theoretic (IT) privacy is too
impractical to be used in the real-world: we propose to build simple and reusable IT-encryption
solutions whose only efficiency penalty (compared to computationally-secure schemes) comes from a
large secret key size, which is often a rather minor inconvenience, as storage is cheap. In particular,
our solutions are stateless and locally computable at the optimal rate, meaning that honest parties
do not maintain state and read only (optimally) small portions of their large keys with every use.
Moreover, we also propose a novel architecture for outsourcing the storage of these long keys to
a network of semi-trusted servers, trading the need to store large secrets with the assumption that it
is hard to simultaneously compromise too many publicly accessible ad-hoc servers. Our architecture
supports everlasting privacy and post-application security of the derived one-time keys, resolving two
major limitations of a related model for outsourcing key storage, called bounded storage model.
Both of these results come from nearly optimal constructions of so called doubly-affine extractors:
locally-computable, seeded extractors Ext(X, S) which are linear functions of X (for any fixed seed
S), and protect against bounded affine leakage on X. This holds unconditionally, even if (a) affine
leakage may adaptively depend on the extracted key R = Ext(X, S); and (b) the seed S is only
computationally secure. Neither of these properties are possible with general-leakage extractors.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Security and privacy → Information-theoretic techniques
Keywords and phrases extractors, information-theoretic privacy, everlasting privacy
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.13
Related Version Full Version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/637 [13]
Funding Yevgeniy Dodis: Yevgeniy Dodis was partially supported by gifts from VMware Labs,
Facebook and Google, and NSF grants 1815546, 2055578.
1 Introduction
Information-theoretic (IT) security is very attractive as it enables provably secure schemes
that resist advances in computational power, novel cryptanalysis, or the possibility of quantum
computers. This is especially important for privacy applications, where huge amounts of
encrypted communication are being stored and recorded, with the danger that all these
communications could be decrypted years later. Unfortunately, the famous impossibility
result of Shannon [28, 10] states that IT-secure schemes come at a price: the secret should
be at least as large as the message. The traditional interpretation of this negative result is
that one must settle for much weaker computational security, so as to make the problem of
key distribution feasible.
1.1 Reusable IT-Encryption
As we observe, just because the secret key must be large does not make the system automat-
ically impractical. In fact, since local storage is often cheap, a (necessarily) large secret key
X might be a very reasonable price to pay for unconditional security, provided this is the
© Yevgeniy Dodis and Kevin Yeo;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY 4.0
2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021).
Editor: Stefano Tessaro; Article No. 13; pp. 13:1–13:23
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
13:2 Doubly-Affine Extractors, and Their Applications
only efficiency penalty when compared to computationally-secure schemes. For the purposes
of this work, we will interpret this latter requirement by demanding that our solutions are
simultaneously stateless and locally-computable.
Stateless. Our first requirement demands that parties keep no state beyond storing the
original key X. This is crucial when there are many parties that cannot easily remain
synchronized together. For example, this could be the case when the secret key is shared by
k ≫ 2 parties and each party cannot view all transmissions (possibly intentionally). It also
removes out-of-sync errors as a common potential source of insecurity that cause multiples
parties to accidentally reuse the same portion of the key. In particular, statelessness rules
out trivial solutions where parties slowly utilize consecutive (fresh) portions shared key X
(e.g., as one-time pads) until X “runs out” that is infeasible with many parties.
Locally Computable. Our second requirement of local compatibility ensures that each
concrete application of the scheme (both as sender and receiver) only accesses the long
secret key X in very few locations. We call this number of locations p the probe complexity,
and the ratio α = mp ∈ [0; 1] the locality of a given solution. Requiring p ≪ |X| rules
out elegant (stateless) solutions using so called ℓ-wise independent hash functions, because
all conventional ℓ-wise independent hash functions read the entire long key X for every
evaluation.
Rate of IT-encryption. We can now define our first motivating question more formally. As
the “price” for being stateless and locally computable, we introduce a “waste” parameter
β > 0, indicating that the total length of all the messages we wish to (statelessly) encrypt
is bounded by (1 − β)|X|. Given this “waste” β > 0 and message length m, our goal is to
minimize the probe complexity p (and maximize locality α).
It is not hard to see (this follows from the more general observation of [30]) that p ≥ m/β
(i.e., α ≤ β), which is indeed independent of the key length |X|. Intuitively, since in any
stateless scheme up to (1 − β)-fraction of X might have been already used to encrypt prior
messages, one needs to sample on average 1/β bits of X to get an “unused” bit. We ask
if this exact bound is tight, and optimal locality α ≈ β can be achieved, perhaps up to an
sub-linear additive loss (that we denote by o(m) while omitting the security parameter λ
from notation)?
▶ Open Problem 1. Design practical, stateless and reusable IT-secure encryption schemes
of m-bit messages with n-bit key and probe complexity p = m/β + o(m), where (1 − β)n is the
upper bound on the total length of the encrypted messages.
As one of our main results, we present the first affirmative solution to this open question,
achieving p = m/β + O(
√
λ(m + λ))) = m/β + o(m), whenever message length m = ω(λ).
Our scheme is quite practical. We present the exact expression with no hidden constants
in Theorems 13 and 15, and demonstrate concrete improvements over prior state-of-the-art
solutions [5, 4] in Section 6.
1.2 Delegating Storage
While solving Open Problem 1 means that long secrets is the only “price” for unconditional
security (when compared to computationally-secure schemes), we would like to do even better,
and delegate the storage of these large keys (to a cloud provider as an example). Since this
clearly overcomes the Shannon’s impossibility result, we require strong trust assumptions
with the storage server.
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To achieve this ambitious goal, our encryption scheme for message M will compute
a ciphertext C = (S, R ⊕ M), where R = Ext(X, S), Ext is a carefully chosen locally
computable extractor [30] and S is a fresh random seed chosen by the sender. At a high level,
we would like the server to store X instead of the users, and only the honest sender/receiver(s)
be able to retrieve the correct one-time pads R = Ext(X, S) from the server.
Basic Architecture. As the first attempt, imagine some virtual server T will choose the
long random string X, for the altruistic purpose of helping users utilize “reusable IT-security”.
In our final architecture, the virtual server will be emulated by a network of semi-trusted
servers under (still strong, but) more plausible trust and communication assumptions. But,
for now, we will think of T as not only stateless and locally computable, but also fully trusted,
incorruptible, and having private channels to any user who contacts it.1
Since T might not even know its user base, we assume that T is truly public, and does
not perform any explicit authentication. Hence, anybody, including the attacker A, can send
a seed S to T, and get back the value R = Ext(X, S). However, we assume that the total
length of one-time pads obtained by the attacker is bounded by (1 − β)|X| that may be
achieved by ensuring that servers stop responding after a certain number of requests.
Sharing the seed. In the setting of Section 1.1, the seed S used to derive R = Ext(X, S)
was sent in the clear, as part of the ciphertext C = (S, R ⊕ M). This was fine since access to
X was given only to the honest uses, and not the attacker A. Now, however, S cannot be
sent in the clear, as then A can directly query T on S, just as the honest recipient would.
Now, we need some mechanism how only the authorized parties learn S. Moreover, they
need to do this repeatedly for every new message M . This looks like a chicken-and-egg
problem, as transmitting fresh seeds while protecting their privacy unconditionally is as hard
as solving the reusable IT-encryption. To resolve this dilemma, we would like for this idea to
work even if the seed S is shared using some computationally-secure mechanism. As natural
examples, parties can (a) run fresh Diffie-Hellman key agreement to generate S; or (b) share
a short symmetric key k once, and have the sender computationally encrypt seed S using k;
or (c) in the public-key setting, computationally encrypt S using the receiver’s public key.
In all of these scenarios, we want to claim that M is remains private forever, as long as the
privacy of S is not broken during the lifetime of server T. We call this notion of privacy
everlasting privacy, following the terminology of [2].
Allowing adversarial seeds. In the setting of Section 1.1, the attacker could only observe
prior extractor outputs Ext(X, Si) on honestly chosen, random seeds Si. In contrast, the
current setting enables the adversary A to learn outputs Ext(X, Si) on adversarial seeds
Si. Moreover, the seed Si could be chosen effectively depending on the “challenge one-
time pad” R = Ext(X, S). With respect to the security game, if A observes “challenge
encryption” P = R ⊕ M and knows the message M ∈ {V0, V1}. Therefore, A can deduce
R ∈ {P ⊕V0, P ⊕V1} without knowing the “challenge seed” S. Hence we want our architecture
to be post-application secure [12]. That is, it should be safe to let the attacker interact with
the servers, even after the honest parties use the challenge encryption P (either large portions
of P or all of P may be leaked to A).
1 These strong assumptions will be substantially weakened, once we replace the virtual server by several
“real” servers. This is similar in spirit to IT secret sharing [27] and MPC literature [8], which assume
private channels to uncorrupted servers. However, we will do even better, as there are no “consistency
requirements” for generating randomness. For example, our servers will be ad hoc, and do not
communicate (or possibly even know!) about each other. See Section 5.2.
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To summarize the preceding discussion, to soundly realize our basic architecture for
key delegation, the chosen extractor Ext(X, S) must be (a) everlastingly private with
computationally-secure seeds; and (b) post-application secure.
▶ Open Problem 2. Design IT-secure, locally computable extractor Ext for the sound
implementation of the basic delegation architecture. In particular, Ext should be post-
application secure and support computationally-secure seeds.
In this work we design the first architecture which supports these guarantees. Moreover,
we show how to distribute the virtual server among several servers, only some of which
can be trusted. Our solution is (a) ad-hoc, meaning servers do not need to know about
or coordinate with each other, and (b) almost fully stateless, meaning the servers need to
maintain minimal-to-no state except to ensure that adversaries view a bounded amount of
leakage.
1.3 Locally Computable Extractors to the Rescue?
Our first hope is that standard locally computable extractors (LCEs), as originally formalized
in the context of Bounded Storage Model (BSM) encryption [30], would be precisely what
we need to solve Open Problems 1 and 2. Such an extractor Ext(X, S) is guaranteed to
work on a uniform, n-bit key X, even despite the attacker obtaining up (1 − β)n leakage
bits L = f(X), for any function f of attacker’s choice. In particular, by modeling previous
extractor outputs Ext(X, Si) as leakage on X, the resulting scheme appears to be suffice for
our purposes of building reusable IT-encryption. Unfortunately, general LCEs do not work
for either of our questions, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Suboptimal Rate. While the best upper bound [30] on the locality α of LCEs is the same
α ≤ β as we have in our simpler setting, we currently do not have schemes matching this
bound. Thus, this approach will not help us resolve Open Problem 1. The best known scheme
of [5] achieves α0(β) ≈ − log2(1 − h−12 (β)), where h2(z) = −z log2(z) − (1 − z) log2(1 − z)
is the binary entropy function, and h−12 (β) takes the smaller of two possible inverses. It is
easy to see that α0(β) ≪ β for all β even slightly bounded away from 0 and 1. For example,
α0(0.5) = 0.168 ≪ 0.5 and α0(0.1) = 0.019 ≪ 0.1. In fact, [5] proved the optimality of
their particular proof technique based on the so called “subkey prediction lemma” [1, 5, 4]
(although it is conceivable a better non-asymptotic LCE bound will be found with a different
technique; e.g., those from [24, 30]).
Computationally Secure Seeds. Just like in our setting from Section 1.2, supporting
computationally secure seeds would be a huge win for the BSM setting. Surprisingly, several
works [19, 15] showed that the BSM (and LCE) is too general to handle computationally-
secure seeds. First, everlasting privacy in the BSM may not be reduced in a black-box manner
to any computational assumption [19]. Second, there are explicit examples of computationally
secure mechanisms to generate S which would break BSM security for any LCE. For example,
if the attacker knows encryption Z of S under some fully homomorphic encryption (FHE),
this still leaves S computationally secure. Yet, the attacker can efficiently evaluate Ext(X, ·)
inside the ciphertext as its compact leakage function L = f(X, Z), learning FHE of the
one-time pad R = Ext(X, S). When the attacker later becomes unbounded, it can break the
FHE, and learn R.
Fortunately, this attack on BSM does not translate to our setting in the delegated storage
setting. The servers will refuse to homomorphically evaluate the given ciphertext, as this
does not correspond to evaluating Ext(X, Si) on some seed Si. However, it shows that we
need a more refined approach to provably achieve everlasting privacy.
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Post-Application Security. In the traditional BSM setting, the leakage L = f(X) may
only depend on the random source X. For post-application security, however, we allow the
leakage function to also depend on R; that is, L = f(X, R). Unfortunately, general LCEs
cannot be post-application secure, at least for the interesting setting when |S| < |R|.2 To
see this, consider a boolean leakage function f(X, R) which is 1 if and only there exists some
seed S which yields R = Ext(X, S). When |S| < |R|, such f(X, R) will always be true with
“real” R, but almost never true with random R (see our full version for more details).
Once again, this attack does not translate to our setting, as such leakage does not
correspond to evaluating Ext(X, Si) on some seed Si. However, it shows that we need a
more refined approach to provably achieve post-application-security.
1.4 Doubly-Affine Extractors
To overcome the limitations of existing LCEs, we notice that, for both of our application
scenarios, the leakage of X consists of values Ext(X, Si) for various seeds Si. Hence, we can
try to design efficient extractors which are only secure against leakage of their own outputs.
Moving forward, we will denote LCEs with this property as simply extractors. With this
approach, we will resolve both Open Problems 1 and 2.
Linearity. We observe that most existing LCEs [2, 15, 22, 30] are linear (affine) functions of
X (for any fixed S). For our settings, an affine extractor only needs to be secure against what
is called affine leakage functions resulting from previous extractor outputs. Such extractors
are called affine extractors [16], and certainly appear easier than “general leakage” extractors.
However, until now affine extractors have only been considered in the seedless setting. As a
result, these seedless affine extractors are neither locally computable, nor linear.
In this work, we initiate the study of seeded affine extractors which are both locally
computable and linear functions of the source X. For conciseness, we will call such (seeded,
locally computable) extractors doubly-affine, where “affine” now refers to both the leakage
and the extractor itself.
Our Model and its Advantages. The formal security game for doubly-affine extractors is
given in Figure 1. The attack is split in two stage. In this first state, the attacker A1 is given
challenge output R (either Ext(X, S) or uniform), and can make up to ℓ = (1 − β)n adaptive
affine leakage queries. Since these queries are adversarial and our extractor is linear, they
can model extractor outputs Ext(X, S∗) on adversarial seeds S∗. Thus, post-application
security is built into the definition.
In the second stage, the attacker A2 is given the seed S, but cannot make any more
leakage queries. This models everlasting privacy, although not necessarily with respect to
computationally secure seeds (yet). To model the latter concern, we augment the basic
definition in Figure 1 to a seemingly more advanced setting in Figure 2, where some abstract
seed-generating procedure Σ(S′) outputs the extractor seed S and the side-information Z.
This side information Z is given to A1 to help making its affine queries, and the entire seed
S′ used by the computationally secure seed generator is given to the second-stage attacker
A2. We require that the game in Figure 2 is secure against any computationally bounded
A1 and unbounded A2, as long as S remains pseudorandom to A1 given Z.
2 Setting |S| ≥ |R| is uninteresting for BSM, as parties can then use S instead of R.
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For example, to model Diffie-Hellman key exchange, we set S′ = (a, b), Z = (ga, gb) and
S = Prg(gab), for some pseudorandom generator Prg. The fact that we give the values a
and b to A2 now accurately models the fact that an unbounded attacker can break discrete
log of ga and gb eventually, and thus learn more information than simply recovering the
extractor seed S = Prg(gab).
Fortunately, unlike the setting of general LCEs, we show that any doubly-affine extractor
satisfying a the simpler definition in Figure 1 will also automatically satisfy the definition
in Figure 2. Thus, our basic definition in Figure 1 also covers everlasting security against
computationally secure seeds.
Parameters and Efficiency. Last, but not the least, restricting to linear leakage allows
to solve our nearly optimal probe complexity p ≈ m/β, settling Open Problem 1 in the
affirmative. As we show in Section 6, our construction is also concretely efficient, making it
attractive for real-world applications where IT-security matters.
As an additional advantage, it gracefully extends to a more refined model of local
computability, where in addition to the probe complexity p, we also wish to minimize the
number of non-contiguous memory c blocks one needs to read the required p bits. We call this
parameter c cache complexity, as it roughly corresponds to the number of cache misses to read
c non-contiguous regions of memory. Unlike probe complexity, cache complexity does not
have to grow with the number of extracted bits m, and can be as small as c = O(λ), where λ




To summarize, doubly-affine extractors provide all the properties we need to simultaneously
resolve Open Problems 1 and 2.
1.5 Our Constructions and Techniques
Our doubly-affine extractor follow the sample-then-extract approach introduced by
Vadhan [30] for LCE. The first sampling step selects a subset I of p bits of X, denoted by
Y = X|I , and the second step applies a non-local extractor to Y to produce the final output
R. In our work, we improve the parameters for both steps, when the leakage is restricted to
be affine.
Sampler Improvement. The two samplers we analyze were already considered by prior
work on LCEs [23, 24, 30, 5], but our work presents new, improved analyses for the case of
affine leakage. As our key insight, we prove (see Theorem 7) that the optimal affine leakage
strategy against any sampler is to select some physical (1 − β)n bits of X. In other words,
the best adversarial strategy is to simply try and guess as many locations of the sampled
bits as possible.
This result is surprising for two reasons. First, the same equivalence is false for general-
leakage samplers: [5] shows that even simple (but highly non-linear) leakage functions may
greatly outperform physical-bit leakage. Second, the equivalence is false for the overall
setting of doubly-affine extractors. Ignoring locality, for example, parity of all n bits of X is
trivially secure against bounded leakage of up to (n − 1) bits, but is trivially insecure against
a single-bit of affine leakage.
Once we reduce to physical-bit leakage, a simple Chernoff bound easily implies that the
number of “non-leaked” physical bits in a “random-enough” p-bit sample of X is highly
concentrated around its expected value βp – a conclusion which would seem highly non-
obvious without our equivalence.
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Extractor Improvement. Once we know that the sample Y has entropy of approximately
βp in the adversary’s view, we can apply any non-local linear Ext′ to extract m ≈ βp bits
from Y . For concrete security, especially for small values of m, we still want to optimize the
entropy loss (βp − m). Using extractors for general leakage, this entropy loss is known to be
at least 2λ [26], and this bound is easily achieved by many linear extractors (e.g., [20]).
Once again, we observe that our non-local extractor only has to withstand affine leakage.
In particular, we show that the optimal entropy loss for (non-local) doubly-affine extractors
is only λ, saving a factor of two over general-leakage extractors. We present a general con-
struction of such non-local, doubly-affine extractors from rank-preserving matrices (see [11]),
that may be instantiated from a variety of concrete matrices such as Toeplitz matrices.
Seed Length. In our analysis, we did not optimize the length s of S. Existentially, we
show that all our improvements are possible (unconditionally) with s = O(λ), while our
concrete constructions use larger seed length s = O(m + λ log(n)). Such a seed-length
is quite acceptable for most applications, as this only increases the ciphertext length (or
communication with the server T) by a constant factor. Moreover, to match computationally-
secure encryption schemes with optimal ciphertext length m + O(λ), we use the fact that
doubly-affine extractors are everlastingly private with computationally-secure seeds. Hence,
we can use any stream cipher (e.g., SALSA20 or CHACHA) to expand a λ-bit seed S′ into
the required longer seed S = Prg(S′), while maintaining IT-security.
Our reusable IT-encryption in Section 1.1 has ciphertext (S′, Ext(X, Prg(S′)) ⊕ M) of
optimal length (m + λ), matching that of computationally secure schemes! Similarly, the
communication complexity when interacting with our virtual server T from Section 1.2
can be made optimal: λ “upstream” bits S′ from the users, and m “downstream” bits
R = Ext(X, Prg(S′)) from the server. We stress that we need an extremely weak kind
of computational-security security for the Prg: just ability to fool a concrete, and easily
computable statistical test (which we know a random expanding function satisfies w.h.p.).
Thus, it seems extremely plausible that SALSA20 or CHACHA satisfy this combinatorial
property unconditionally. Nevertheless, it is a good theoretical question to improve the seed
length s to the optimal value O(λ).
1.6 Applications
Replicated Setting. We generalize the setting of Section 1.1, where the entire long secret key
X is replicated among several trusted parties. We already saw that doubly-affine extractors
immediately give locally computable, CPA-secure encryption C = (S, Ext(X, S) ⊕ M) with
optimal locality in this setting. In fact, the same scheme is trivially CCA1-secure, since
doubly-affine extractors support leakage of extractor outputs on adversarial seeds S. To get
CCA2 security, and even achieve the strongest notion of authenticated encryption (AE) [6],
the parties can additionally share a short key for computationally-secure MAC, and use this
fixed key to authenticate the ciphertext C = (S, P ) above. In this variant, the authenticity
is computational, but the privacy is everlasting, as long as the MAC is not broken while the
post-challenge decryption oracle is used. Moreover, all these schemes are still everlastingly
private with computationally-secure seeds S, allowing to achieve optimal ciphertext length
(m + O(λ)).
Distributed Setting. We generalize the setting of Section 1.2 where parties delegate the
storage of X to several servers. We already saw that doubly-affine extractors are enough in
the single server case, as they provide the required post-application security and support
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computationally secure seeds. For example, the server T can help the parties to achieve
all the efficiency benefits of (symmetric-key) authenticated encryption with associated data
(AEAD) plus everlasting privacy. All the parties need to do is use a computationally-secure
AEAD (using a short shared key) to encrypt the seed S,3 instead of the message M . Similar
techniques also work in the public-key setting, where S can be appropriately encrypted using
the receiver’s public-key.
While relying on a single trusted server T may be challenging due to privacy of the channel,
we can consider distributed setting with multiple servers t ≥ 2 where we use the standard
assumption in the information-theoretic literature that channels between the user and at
least g servers are secure and the remaining t − g channels may be compromised. This is an
assumption that has been used in many prior seminal works including information-theoretic
secret sharing [27], multi-party computation [8] and secure message transmission [14].
Specifically, we extend our architecture to the setting of t ≥ 2 servers, who jointly emulate
the virtual server T. In more detail, each of the t servers will independently generate and
store a subset of the random source X. For the distributed setting, we only assume that
g ≤ t servers are honest with a private channel to users. Moreover, the servers do not need
to coordinate, or even know each other’s existence: each simply picks a random string, and
provides access to its random string to users.
We also consider two cases where the (t−g) corrupted servers are either honest-but-curious
or malicious. Our honest-but-curious solution works for any g ≥ 1, and achieves multiplicative
overhead roughly t/g for the user, as compared to the single-server case. In particular, each
server accesses and returns a sub-linear number of bits p′ ≈ m/(βg). For the malicious
setting, we necessarily assume that g > 2t/3, and use simple error-correcting techniques to
achieve overhead roughly t/(3g − 2t), with each server returning p′ ≈ m/(β(3g − 2t)) bits.
2 Definitions
In this section, we formally define doubly-affine extractors that output affine functions of
the random source while tolerating affine leakage. We start by presenting the affine oracle
that provides linear access to a truly random string. Afterwards, we define doubly-affine
extractors in both the information theoretic and computationally secure settings.
2.1 Affine Leakage Model
In the affine leakage model, there is a uniformly random string X ∈ {0, 1}n. Throughout
our work, X is referred to as the source or random source. The string X is accessed through
an affine oracle that receives a n-bit string Q ∈ {0, 1}n and returns the dot product of
LINX(Q) = Q · X. In other words, one query to the affine oracle enables retrieving the XOR
of a subset of bits of X.
For convenience, multiple queries to the affine oracle may be represented using a single
matrix. In particular, q queries may be represented using a q × n bit-matrix Q ∈ {0, 1}q×n
such that LINX(Q) = QX where the affine oracle returns the multiplication of Q and X
resulting q bits.
▶ Definition 1. For any X ∈ {0, 1}n, the affine oracle LINX receives a q × n binary matrix
Q ∈ {0, 1}q×n for any q ≥ 1. Then, LINX(Q) = QX.
3 Technically, S should be encrypted with associated data P = R⊕M .
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2.2 Information-Theoretic Doubly-Affine Extractors
The main focus of our work is to construct efficient extractors in the affine leakage model.
The goal of a doubly-affine extractor is to utilize a short random seed along with access to
the oracle LINX to derive a random string that may be used at higher level applications.
For security, the extractor’s output should remain random even if an adversary uses the
oracle LINX to learn large (but not all) of the underlying random string X.
In more detail, extractors are defined as algorithms that receive a random s-bit seed and
output a m-bit random string where m > s (that is, the output random string is larger than
the input seed). Extractors are able to perform queries to the oracle LINX to access the
uniformly random string X. The output of extractors should remain random to an adversary
that has utilized the oracle LINX to learn at most ℓ bits about the random string X.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to extractors that only perform non-adaptive
queries to LINX . In other words, the extractor must pick a single query matrix Q, send
it to the LINX and use the response to generate the output. To our knowledge, all prior
works also exclusively studied extractors that non-adaptively accessed the underlying random
string X. Non-adaptivity may be beneficial in settings where sending queries to LINX may
be expensive.
For convenience, we will make the assumption that the output of doubly-affine extractors
will simply be the response from the single query to the oracle LINX . We show that this
limitation is not important as our constructions will be essentially optimal. With this
restriction, the output of doubly-affine extractors will also be affine. This property will be
integral in settings when the adversary’s leakage consists of previous extractor outputs.
We define extractors as Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}m where the first argument is the
n-bit random string, the second argument is s-bit random seed and the output are the m
extracted bits. As we consider non-adaptive extractors, we note that all extractors Ext are
uniquely defined by a query algorithm PickExt : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}m×n that outputs a m × n
binary matrix that will be query to the oracle LINX . Since Ext returns the output from
the oracle, we note that Ext(X, S) = LINX(Pick(S)) for any n-bit random string X and
s-bit random seed. We will use Ext and PickExt interchangeably in our paper.
The security of doubly-affine extractors are presented in Figure 1. The adversary A is
given a challenge of either a m-bit unifomly random string or the extractor output. Using
the oracle LINX , A may perform ℓ adaptive queries to learn at most ℓ linear functions of X
with knowledge of the challenge. Afterwards, A is given the input seed and must guess the
origin of the challenge. We say A has ε advantage if A has 1/2 + ε probability of guessing
correctly. For ease of presentation, we split A into stateful adversaries A1 and A2 that are
responsible for generate oracle queries and computing the final guess respectively. We note
that both adversaries are computationally unbounded.
We stress that A is given the challenge prior to performing any queries to the oracle LINX .
As a result, we require that doubly-affine extractors provide security against post-application
leakage. This is a notion that is not achievable in other models with general leakage (we
present a counterexample in our full version). By restricting to linear leakage, we enable a
significant improvement in security.
▶ Definition 2. A deterministic algorithm Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}m is (ℓ, ε)-secure
if for any adversary A, Pr[G(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, A) = 1] ≤ 12 + ε.
We move onto the efficiency of extractors. We define the probe complexity of an extractor
as the number of bits of X accessed by the oracle in a single extractor execution. We define
the cache complexity of an extractor as the number of disjoint regions of X accessed by the
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G(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, A = (A1, A2))
C A = (A1, A2)
Draw b← U1.
Draw X ← Un.
Draw challenge seed S ← Us.
If b = 0, set R← Ext(X, S).
If b = 1, draw R← Um.
R
−−−−−−−−−−−→
t1 Set t1 ← A1(R).
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Set L1 ← LINX(t1). L1
−−−−−−−−−−−→
. . . . . . . . .
tℓ Set tℓ ← A1(R, L1, . . . , Lℓ−1).
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Set Lℓ ← LINX(tℓ). Lℓ
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Set state← A1(R, L1, . . . , Lℓ).
Send seed S as challenge. S
−−−−−−−−−−−→
b′ Set b′ ← A2(S, state).
←−−−−−−−−−−−
If b ̸= b′, output 0.
If b = b′, output 1.
Figure 1 Game G(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, A).
oracle in a single extractor execution. Probe complexity measures the total running time
of oracle in a single extractor execution while cache complexity measures the number of
cache misses incurred in a single extractor execution. Note that probe complexity may be
measured as the number of non-zero columns in the query matrix produced by PickExt.
Cache complexity corresponds to the number of consecutive groups of non-zero columns
found in the query matrix produced by PickExt.
▶ Definition 3. Ext is (p, c)-local if for every seed S, PickExt(S) has at most p non-zero
columns and at most c consecutive non-zero column groups.
2.3 Computational Doubly-Affine Extractors
As another advantage of doubly-affine extractors, we show that they may be built even when
using seeds that are only computationally-secure. In more detail, suppose the extractor’s
input seed is computationally-secure with respect to leakage seen by the adversary. Is it
possible for the extractor’s output to remain information-theoretically random with help
from the affine oracle? This is impossible for computationally unbounded adversaries with
access to the oracle as the adversary may compute the seed and query the oracle to obtain
the extractor’s output. Instead, we want computational extractors to produce outputs that
are secure against adversaries that are computationally-bounded only when the oracle is
available and may become computationally-unbounded afterwards. The ability to handle
computationally-secure seeds is a benefit of the affine leakage model that is impossible in
general leakage models (see [15, 19]).
The security game for computational extractors is shown in Figure 2. As a major
result, we will prove that the security games in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are equivalent (see
Section 4). That is, every information-theoretic extractor is also a computational extractor.
We consider hybrid adversaries A = (A1, A2) where A1 is a stateful PPT adversary and
A2 is a computationally unbounded adversary. The game uses a computationally-secure
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Gc(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, Σ, A1, A2)
C A = (A1, A2)
Draw b← U1.
Draw X ← Un.
Draw S′ ← Us′ .
Draw (S, Z)← Σ(S′).
If b = 0, set R← Ext(X, S).
If b = 1, draw R← Um.
R, Z
−−−−−−−−−−−→
t1 Set t1 ← A1(Z, R).
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Set L1 ← LINX(t1). L1
−−−−−−−−−−−→
. . . . . . . . .
tℓ Set tℓ ← A1(Z, R, L1, . . . , Lℓ−1).
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Set Lℓ ← LINX(tℓ). Lℓ
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Set state← A1(Z, R, L1, . . . , Lℓ).
Send seed S′ as challenge. S′
−−−−−−−−−−−→
b′ Set b′ ← A2(S′, state).
←−−−−−−−−−−−
If b ̸= b′, output 0.
If b = b′, output 1.
Figure 2 Game Gc(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, Σ, A1, A2).
protocol Σ that produces a computational seed S as well as leakage Z using a (typically)
shorter random seed S′. A1 is given both the extractor’s output and the leakage Z of Σ.
The role of A1 is to adaptively query the oracle LINX to learn ℓ bits about X. A2 will use
the knowledge gained by A1 as well as the original seed S′ to distinguish between challenges
of either uniformly random strings or extractor outputs.
▶ Definition 4. A deterministic algorithm Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}m is (ℓ, Σ, ε)-
computationally-secure if for any hybrid adversary A = (A1, A2) such that A1 is PPT,
Pr[Gc(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, Σ, A) = 1] ≤ 12 + ε.
3 Information-Theoretic Doubly-Affine Extractors
In this section, we present our constructions for information-theoretic doubly-affine extractors.
We start by reducing the security game of doubly-affine extractors to linear algebraic
concepts. Afterwards, we show that constructing doubly-affine extractors requires two
simpler primitives: samplers and non-local doubly-affine extractors (or non-local extractor,
for short). By presenting efficient samplers and non-local doubly-affine extractors, we obtain
our final efficient extractor. We also present various lower bounds for the studied primitives.
3.1 Optimal Doubly-Affine Extractor Adversary
One of the main results in our paper is the ability to reduce the complex security game of
doubly-affine extractors to a simpler game. Consider the following adversarial approach to
compromise doubly-affine extractors according to the security game in Figure 1. Suppose
the adversary has chosen ℓ queries to LINX . Next, the adversary receives the seed S and
computes the query matrix PickExt(S). Next, the adversary checks whether extractor’s
output bits is a linear combination of any of the ℓ leakage bits. This is equivalent to checking
whether the span of the extractor’s queries intersects the span of the adversary’s queries.
In the case of an intersection, the adversary can check whether the output bit matches the
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G⊕(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, A)
C A
t1, . . . , tℓ Set t1, . . . , tℓ ← A().
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Draw S ← Us.
Compute s1, . . . , sm ← PickExt(S).
Set S ← span(s1, . . . , sm).
Set L ← span(t1, . . . , tℓ).
Set d← dim(S ∩ L).
Output 1 if d > 0.
Output 0 if d = 0.
Figure 3 Linear Span Game G⊕(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, A).
linear combination. For real challenges, this is always true. For random challenges, this is
only true with probability 1/2. Therefore, the adversary has significant advantage as long as
the intersection of query spans is non-empty.
We show that the above adversary is essentially optimal up to choosing the oracle queries.
Formally, we prove this by showing the security game in Figure 1 is equivalent to the same
simpler game in Figure 3. The game in Figure 3 severely limits the adversary by forcing the
adversary to follow the above adversarial approach. The adversary must ignore both ignore
the extractor output and non-adaptively query the oracle. Additionally, the adversary loses
the ability to post-process the oracle results. Instead, the challenger determines the winner
of the game by checking whether the intersection of the adversarial query subspace and the
extractor query subspace is non-empty. We show the games in Figures 1 and 3 are identical.
As a caveat, we note that the adversary could also check whether the extractor’s outputs
bit are linearly independent. If any output bit is a linear combination of the other output
bits, then the adversary will already win the game. For real challenges, the linearly dependent
output bit must match the linear combination of the other output bits. For random challenges,
this only happens 1/2 of the time. Therefore, we will assume that the extractor outputs bits
will be linearly independent. In other words, the extractor’s oracle queries will always be
linearly independent without loss of generality.
▶ Theorem 5. Suppose that Ext is (ℓ, ε)-secure with respect to security game G⊕. That
is, for any adversary A, Pr[G⊕(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, A) = 1] ≤ ε. Then, Ext is (ℓ, ε)-secure with
respect to G according to Definition 2.
With this theorem, we already see that the main challenge for extractors is to ensure
output bits are not a linear combination of the adversarial oracle queries.
3.2 Sample-then-Extract Paradigm
To construct doubly-affine extractors, we use the sample-then-extract paradigm that was
introduced by Vadhan [30]. This paradigm constructs extractors in two steps. First, a subset
of the random string X is sampled such that the sample contains a large amount of entropy
conditioned on the adversary’s leakage. Next, a non-local doubly-affine extractor (that we
will also denote as a non-local extractor) is executed on the sampled subset. The non-local
extractor is expected to utilize the entirety of the sampled subset to produce as many random
bits as possible (since no locality is required, they are denoted as non-local).
We now explain at a high level why the sample-then-extract algorithm results in an
extractor. All the sampled bits will not be random after the adversary views leakage bits. If
the adversary sees ℓ bits of the n-bit random string X, then we expect only (1 − ℓ/n)-fraction
of the sampled bits to be random. The role of the non-local extractor is to condense the
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G⊕,λ(Samp, n, s, p, ℓ, A)
C A
t1, . . . , tℓ Set t1, . . . , tℓ ← A().
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Draw S ← Us.
Compute I1, . . . , Ip ← PickSamp(S).
Set S ← span(1I1 , . . . ,1Ip ).
Set L ← span(t1, . . . , tℓ).
Set d← dim(S ∩ L).
Output 1 if p− d < λ.
Output 0 if p− d ≥ λ.
Figure 4 Relaxed Linear Span Game G⊕,λ(Samp, n, s, p, ℓ, A).
Gunit,λ(Samp, n, s, p, ℓ, A)
C A
T1, . . . , Tℓ Set T1, . . . , Tℓ ← A().
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Draw S ← Us.
Compute I1, . . . , Ip ← PickSamp(S).
Set S ← span(1I1 , . . . ,1Ip ).
Set L ← span(1T1 , . . . ,1Tℓ ).
Set d← dim(S ∩ L).
Output 1 if p− d < λ.
Output 0 if p− d ≥ λ.
Figure 5 Relaxed Unit Span Game Gunit,λ(Samp, n, s, p, ℓ, A).
mixture of random and non-random sampled bits into a smaller string of truly random bits.
We will define and construct samplers and non-local extractors in the upcoming sections.
3.3 Samplers
The notion of samplers has been well studied in the past (see [7, 9, 24, 31, 30, 17] as some
examples). Prior works studied samplers with respect to general functionalities and/or
general leakage. In our work, we define samplers in a narrower manner within the affine
leakage model that will be easily composable in the sample-then-extract paradigm.
Samplers are deterministic algorithms Samp : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}p with inputs of
a n-bit random string X and a s-bit seed S that outputs p sampled bits of X. The goal is to
sample as many random bits as possible in the view of the adversary with leakage bits. As
discussed in the previous section, it is unlikely that all sampled bits will be secure. If an
adversary has ℓ random leakage bits of X, then only (1 − ℓ/n)p sampled bits will be secure
in expectation.
For any Samp, we denote PickSamp as the queries sent to the oracle (similar to ex-
tractors). The output of Samp will also be the response from the oracle. In other words,
Samp(X, S) = LINX(PickSamp(S)). As Samp samples bits, each column of PickSamp(S)
is a unit vector. We will use Samp and PickSamp interchangeably throughout the paper.
We relax the security game of doubly-affine extractors (Figure 3) to obtain a security
game for samplers in affine leakage model presented in Figure 4. Recall that the extractor
adversary should not compromise any output bits. We modify the definition for samplers so
at least λ sampled bits are random in the adversary’s view. We chose to immediately define
samplers with respect to the optimal adversary for convenience. One could re-define sampler
security using a natural game by relaxing the security of doubly-affine extractors in Figure 1.
▶ Definition 6. A deterministic algorithm Samp : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}s → {0, 1}p is (ℓ, ε, λ)-secure
if for any adversary A, Pr[G⊕,λ(Ext, n, s, m, ℓ, A) = 1] ≤ ε.
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Specific to samplers, we immediately show that the adversary may immediately be
weakened without loss of generality. Consider a simple adversary for samplers that also
samples ℓ bits from X. If the adversary samples λ + 1 bits identical to the sampler, the
adversary will distinguish the real-or-random challenge with high advantage. We prove that
this adversary is optimal. In other words, sampler adversaries do not gain advantage by
learning linear combinations of X as opposed to sampling single bits of X. To formalize
this idea, we modify the sampler game in Figure 4 such that the adversary may only sample
physical bits of X. The new game may be found in Figure 5.
▶ Theorem 7. Suppose that Samp is (ℓ, ε, λ)-secure with respect to security game Gunit,λ.
That is, for any adversary A, Pr[Gunit,λ(Samp, n, s, m, ℓ, A) = 1] ≤ ε. Then, Samp is
(ℓ, ε, λ)-secure with respect to G⊕,λ according to Definition 6.
The above security reductions significantly simplify analyzing sampler security. Before
moving on, we highlight that the majority of our efficiency gains are achieved from our
improved samplers. In particular, the insight that optimal sampler adversaries in the affine
leakage model model are limited is the key reason as to why our doubly-affine extractors are
more efficient than previous constructions in the general leakage model.
(p, c)-Local Sampler Construction. We start by presenting an efficient (p, c)-local sampler.
The idea is to view the n-bit source X as a two-dimensional matrix with c rows and n/c
columns and the seed S = (S1, . . . , Sc) as c integers from the set [n/c] that are represented
using log(n/c) bits. The sampler will sample p/c bits from each row. In the i-th row, the
sampler chooses the consecutive p/c bits starting from the Si-th column. Samp is (p, c)-local
as a total of p bits are sampled that may be arranged into c consecutive groups (one group
per row). Our construction is similar to ones presented in [15], but is was never analyzed or
defined as a stand-alone sampler.
▶ Theorem 8. For any 0 ≤ ℓ < n, c > 0, ε > 0 and λ > 0, there exists a (p, c)-local sampler
that is (ℓ, ε, λ)-secure with seed length s = c log(n/c) and probe complexity
p = max
c, λ





We note that the efficiency of our sampler is almost optimal. Note that an adversary
may always pick ℓ random bits of X as leakage. If p bits are sampled, it is expected that
only (1 − ℓ/n)p sampled bits are secure. Our construction secure samples λ = (1 − ℓ/n −√
ln(1/ε)/c)p bits implying that at most (
√
ln(1/ε)/c)-fraction of bits are lost beyond the
expectation.
(p, p)-Local Sampler Construction. For the setting where cache complexity is irrelevant, we
present a (p, p)-local sampler that ends up being more concretely efficient in our full version.
Our construction simply picks a subset of p bits from X uniformly at random using a seed S





3.4 Non-Local Doubly-Affine Extractors
In the sample-then-extract paradigm, the goal of non-local extractors is to take sampled
bits containing both random and non-random bits and produce a truly random string. We
abstract the setting to the original doubly-affine extractor security game by assuming that
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the non-random bits are leakage viewed by the adversary. In other words, we assume that
the random source X has n random bits except that ℓ bits are not random as they have been
viewed by the adversary.
The simplest way to build non-local extractors is to use affine universal hash functions
and the leftover hash lemma [20]. As the input string X has n − ℓ random bits, the leftover
hash lemma states that there exists a non-local extractor that outputs n − ℓ − 2 log(1/ε)
random bits except with probability ε.
In our work, we improve upon this result by constructing non-local extractors that
produces n − ℓ − log(1/ε) random bits. This reduces the lost entropy by a factor of two. The
ability to build improved non-local extractors is another advantage of doubly-affine extractors.
To do this, we generically reduce the construction of non-local extractors to a special family
of matrices with certain properties. Consider m matrices A1, . . . , Am with n rows and s
columns. For any non-empty subset ∅ ≠ I ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, the matrix AI =
∑
i∈I Ai has rank
n. We present an instantiation using field multiplication.
Special Matrix Family from Toeplitz Matrices. We instantiate the matrix family using
Toeplitz matrices to achieve s = n + m − 1. Note, as m ≤ n, the seed length is at most
s ≤ 2n. Toeplitz matrices are the matrices where all diagonals are equal. For any Toeplitz
matrix T , it is always the case that Ti,j = Ti+1,j+1. In particular, we will use Toeplitz
matrices of dimension n × (n + m − 1). We define the set T1, . . . , Tm in the following way. Ti
consists of the first i − 1 columns only of 0’s followed by the n × n identity matrix occupying
the next n columns. All remaining columns will also consist of only 0’s. As an example,
T1 consists of the identity matrix occupying the first n columns followed by all 0’s. Using
this construction, we get that for any seed S ∈ {0, 1}n+m−1, TiS = (Si, Si+1, . . . , Si+n−1).
We note that the computational cost of this instantiation is O(n log n) using FFT (see [25]
for more details). In the full version, we present an instantiation from field multiplication
with smaller seed lengths, but higher computational costs. We use the Toeplitz matrix
instantiation for practical considerations.
▶ Theorem 9. For any subset ∅ ≠ I ⊆ [1, . . . , m], TI =
∑
i∈I Ti has rank n.
Non-Local Extractor Construction. Our non-local extractor is built using the m matrix
family A1, . . . , Am described above. The non-local extractor receives a s-bit seed S and a
n-bit input string X with m random bits. Then, the output of the non-local extractor is
X · (A1S), . . . , X · (AmS). In other words, the i-th output bit is the dot product of X and
the matrix-vector multiplication of the Ai and the seed S. Our construction is similar to the
one [11], but our security analysis is different, as we extract more bits in our setting.
▶ Theorem 10. For any 0 ≤ ℓ < n and ε > 0, there exists a non-local extractor that is
(ℓ, ε)-secure that outputs m = n − ℓ − log(1/ε) bits with seed length n.
We also present a lower bound on the number of extractable bits by non-local extractors
that is tight up to an additive constant factor.
▶ Theorem 11. Non-local extractors extract at most n − ℓ − log(1/ε) − O(1) bits.
Seed Length. While our construction extracts an almost optimal number of bits, it requires
a large seed length of n. Our seed length is similar to those obtained using the leftover hash
lemma resulting in seed lengths of at least n− ℓ+log(1/ε)−O(1) bits [20]. In our full version,
we existentially show there exists a matrix family that would result in a non-local extractor
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with seed length log(nℓ/ε) while extracting the same number of bits. We also present a seed
length lower bound showing that the existential construction is almost optimal. We leave it
as an open question to construct such a matrix family explicitly, but remind that: (a) in our
setting it is safe to expand the seed computationally (unlike general extractors [3]); (b) in
the random oracle model, one can expand the seed using the random oracle as done in [5, 4];
(c) one can use theoretical extractors of [18] which are linear, have seed O(log n + log(1/ε)),
but double the entropy loss to 2 log(1/ε).
3.5 Doubly-Affine Extractors
With constructions of both samplers and non-local extractors, we finally construct our local
extractors. First, we will formally define the sample-then-extract paradigm and show that
it is secure. Afterwards, we plug in our sampler and non-local extractor constructions to
obtain our efficient local extractors.
Sample-then-Extract. We formally define the sample-then-extract composition. Suppose we
have a sampler Samp with seed length SSamp that samples p bits. Note, the corresponding
PickSamp algorithm outputs a p × n query matrix. Additionally, assume we have a non-local
extractor NLExt with seed length SNLExt that extracts from an p-bit input and produces
m-bit outputs. The corresponding PickNLExt algorithm outputs a m × p query matrix. The
resulting local extractor Ext is defined by its oracle query function
PickExt(S = (SSamp, SNLExt)) = PickNLExt(SNLExt)PickSamp(SSamp).
In other words, the oracle query sent by Ext is the matrix multiplication of the query
matrices chosen by NLExt and Samp.
▶ Theorem 12. Let Samp be a (ℓ, ε1, λ)-secure sampler with seed length S1 that samples p
bits from an n-bit source and NLExt be a (p − λ, ε2)-secure non-local extractor with seed
length S2 that receives a p-bit source and outputs m bits. Then, there exists an extractor
Ext that that is (ℓ, ε1 + ε2)-secure with seed length S1 + S2 that outputs m bits. If Samp is
(p, c)-local, then Ext is (p, c)-local.
Using the above theorem, we present our constructions using our sampler and non-local
extractors. The resulting extractors are more efficient than all prior works (see Section 6).
▶ Theorem 13 ((p, c)-Local Extractor). For any 0 ≤ ℓ < n, m > 0 and ε > 0, there exists
an (p, c)-local extractor that is (ℓ, ε)-secure with seed length s = c log(n/c) + p with probe
complexity
p = max
c, m + log(2/ε)





for any cache complexity c ≥ ln(2/ε)(1 − ℓ/n)−2.
We note that our extractor is almost optimal in terms of randomness efficiency. Once
again, we can consider a simple adversary that samples ℓ leakage bits of X randomly. For any
extractor with probe complexity p, only (1 − ℓ/n)-fraction of the probed bits will be random
in expectation. Our extractor is able to produce m = (1 − ℓ/n −
√
ln(2/ε)/c)p − log(2/ε)
bits that is only (
√
ln(2/ε)/c)-fraction from the expectation with log(2/ε) additive bit loss.
We also present the following lower bound on cache complexity for extractors.
Y. Dodis and K. Yeo 13:17
▶ Theorem 14. Any (p, c)-local extractor that is (ℓ, ε)-secure with one output bit must have
cache complexity c = Ω(log(1/ε)/ log(np/ℓ)).
In terms of cache complexity, we note that our extractor requires cache complexity at
least ln(2/ε)(1 − ℓ/n)−2. Our extractor’s cache complexity matches the lower bound in the
setting that a constant fraction of bits are leaked, ℓ = Θ(n).
We also present an extractor when cache complexity is ignored (c = p). While both
constructions are asymptotically identical, our (p, p)-local extractor is more concretely efficient.
This construction is also more efficient than all previous schemes (see Section 6).
▶ Theorem 15 ((p, p)-Local Extractor). For any 0 ≤ ℓ < n, m > 0 and ε > 0, there exists
an (p, p)-local extractor that is (ℓ, ε)-secure with seed length s = p log(n/p) + p with probe
complexity p satisfying
ε ≤ 2(m + log(2/ε)) ·
(
n − ℓ









4 Computational Doubly-Affine Extractors
We move onto constructing extractors that are secure when using computationally-secure seeds.
To refresh readers, recall that computational extractors considered security games against
hybrid adversaries A = (A1, A2) where A1 is a PPT adversary and A2 is computationally
unbounded. A1 queries the oracle for information about the random source X using the
real-or-random challenge and seed leakage. After A1 learns ℓ bit of leakage from the oracle,
A2 is able to use all learned information to distinguish a real-or-random challenge. Note
that A1 cannot be computationally unbounded as, otherwise, A1 could derive the original
seed, query the oracle to compute the extractor’s output and compare with the challenge.
For the full definition, we refer readers back to Section 2.3. We re-iterate that computational
seeds are not possible with general leakage [15, 19].
As a major result of our work, we show that any information-theoretic extractor is already
a computational extractor. In other words, our constructions from Section 3.5 are also
computational extractors with similar parameters. In particular, we prove that the security
game in Figure 1 generically implies security with respect to Figure 2.
To prove this result, we will utilize insights similar to the ones presented in Theorem 5.
Recall that Theorem 5 proved that after receiving the extractor seed, the optimal adversary
for information-theoretic extractors simply checked whether any extractor output is a linear
combination of the leakage bits received from the oracle. Note that this post-processing
adversary may be executed in PPT adversary, which is the key reason why doubly-affine
extractors may utilize computational seeds. This statement is not true in other general
leakage models that prevent their usage of computational seeds.
▶ Theorem 16. If Ext is information-theoretically (ℓ, ε)-secure, then Ext is computationally
(ℓ, ε + ε′)-secure if the computationally-secure seed generator is a PPT algorithm that is
secure against PPT adversaries except with probability ε′.
Therefore, our efficient information-theoretic extractors from Section 3.5 are also compu-
tational extractors that may be used with computational seeds.
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5 Applications
In this section, we utilize our doubly-affine extractors to present information-theoretic
encryption solutions. We critically leverage both restrictions of affine output and leakage
in the following way. Let the random source X be the secret key. To encrypt a message
M , one first samples a random seed S and produces the ciphertext (S, Ext(X, S) ⊕ M). To
decrypt a ciphertext (S, M ′), one can compute the value M ′ ⊕ Ext(X, S) = M . In the above
protocol, an adversary with access to encryption/decryption oracles end up only learning
extractor outputs that are affine. As a result, the adversary obtains only affine leakage about
X. So, doubly-affine extractors end up being the perfect primitive for information-theoretic
encryption. While one may also use seeded extractors with general output and leakage, we
show our doubly-affine extractors result in better probe/cache complexity (see Section 6).
5.1 Replicated Setting
We consider the problem with k ≥ 2 parties that need reusable information-theoretic
encryption to communicate multiple messages over potentially insecure channels. This may
also be referred to as the group communication problem. For the case of k = 2, we note
there is a simple stateful solution. Each party consumes the secret key X as one-time pads
starting from different ends and stops when meeting in the middle. However, this solution
does not scale well for k > 2 parties where all parties do not see all encrypted messages. The
natural generalization is to split X into k parts for each party. This is sub-optimal in terms
of utilizing X when some parties encrypt infrequently and other parties encrypt frequently.
By using doubly-affine extractors, we avoid these issues.
IND-CCA1 Encryption. We show that the simple example presented earlier is already an
IND-CCA1 secure for secret key X and messages M .
Enc(X, M) = (S, M ⊕ Ext(X, S)) with uniformly random S.
Dec(X, (S, M ′)) = M ′ ⊕ Ext(X, S).
We prove security in a stronger variant of real-or-random challenges denoted by IND-CCA1$.
The adversary submits a challenge message M . The challenger returns either an encryption
to M or a random string that must be distinguished by the adversary. Note, this requires
that ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random strings.
IND-CCA2 Authenticated Encryption. We present the first application of our computa-
tional doubly-affine extractors for constructing IT authenticated encryption (AE) that is
IND-CCA2$ secure. We assume the existence of a standard, computationally-secure AE with
associated data (AEAD) scheme, EncAEAD and DecAEAD. We assume that the secret key
is (X, KAEAD) where KAEAD is an AE secret key.
Enc((X, KAEAD), M) = (EncAEAD(KAEAD, S, M ′), M ′) with M ′ = M ⊕ Ext(X, S)
and uniformly random S.
Dec((X, KAEAD), (S′, M ′)) = M ′ ⊕ Ext(X, DecAEAD(KAEAD, S′, M ′)) and rejecting
whenever
DecAEAD(KAEAD, S′, M ′) fails authenticity verification.
It is straightforward to adapt our scheme to an IT AEAD by appending associated data
with M ′ in the above scheme. Our construction also achieves authenticity against any PPT
adversaries from the underlying AEAD scheme.
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For security, we adapt our real-or-random challenge from the prior sections where the
adversary must distinguish between an encryption of an adversarially chosen message and
a random string. For IND-CCA2$, the adversary is able to make both encryption and
decryption queries after the challenge. A computationally unbounded adversary in IND-
CCA2$ may trivially break the scheme. For the challenge ciphertext (S′, M ′), the adversary
sends a decryption query for ciphertext (S′, M ′′) where M ′′ ≠ M ′ to receive M ′′ ⊕ Ext(X, S)
where S is the encrypted seed. Therefore, the adversary computes Ext(X, S) and may
break the scheme. Due to this limitation, we consider adversaries that are PPT when
encryption/decryption queries are available but computationally unbounded afterwards.
5.2 Distributed Setting
We consider another setting where the random source X is jointly stored by t ≥ 2 servers.
Each server stores a disjoint subset of X. We will use the standard assumption from
information-theoretic cryptography literature where the user will have a private channel with
only a subset of g < t trusted servers and the remaining t − g channels may be compromised
and/or the servers may be compromised and using faulty randomness. This is a common
assumption that appears in many prior important works such as information-theoretic secret
sharing [27], multi-party computation [8] and secure message transmission [14]. Note users
do not know which servers are compromised. For simplicity, we assume each server stores an
equal portion of X (our analysis is trivial to extend when this is not the case). If there are
t − g bad servers, a (t − g)/t fraction of X will be leaked. Adversaries may also query the
servers to learn affine leakage about the random source X.
We modify our extractors for the multi-server setting. Recall that our extractors first
sample bits then apply a non-local extractor on sampled bits. With multiple servers, our
extractor first executes the sampler portion with each server individually. Afterwards, the
non-local extractor will be executed on all sampled bits to obtain the final extractor output.
In terms of efficiency, we note that the virtual random source has only n := (g/t)|X| random
bits excluding parts of X stored by the bad servers. Any (p, c)-local extractor will probe
(g/t)p bits from good servers and the remaining sampled bits are assumed to be compromised
already. Executing a non-local extractor over all sampled bits can output (g/t)p − log(1/ε)
random bits. By considering the multi-server setting, we must increase the probe complexity
of our extractors by a multiplicative factor of (t/g). In particular, consider any extractor
with probe complexity p in the replicated setting that outputs m bits. To obtain m output
bits in the multi-server setting, our extractors must instead probe (t/g)p bits.
We emphasize that our doubly-affine extractors are easily amenable to the distributed
setting. In particular, the distributed servers do not need any communication or coordination.
The seeds that are sent to each server may be computationally-secure. To encrypt/decrypt a
message M , the communication and computation from each server is sub-linear in the length
of M . Our encryption schemes are easily adaptable to settings where servers may go offline
and new servers join as well if servers are malicious. Most of these great properties are not
be obtainable by other primitives when moving to distributed settings (such as MPC).
As one requirement, servers must limit the leakage that may be obtained by an adversary.
To do this, the servers may keep track of the number of unique bits that are sampled by all
users. To limit adversaries to ℓ leakage bits, the servers should stop responding after ℓ/g
unique queries. As a result, the g servers return at most ℓ leakage bits. Note that keeping
track of the unique sampled bits may be done very efficiently with small storage (using
HyperLogLog [21] as an example).
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Public-Key IND-CCA2 Encryption. With the server setting, there may be a need for
public-key encryption as parties no longer share the secret key. We show that we may build
public-key IND-CCA2$ encryption schemes using our computational doubly-affine extractors.
We re-use our previous IND-CCA2$ definition with the only difference that the adversary
obtains the public key before any encryption/decryption queries.
We will use any public-key encryption (PKE) scheme (EncPK, DecPK) with IND-CCA2
security against PPT adversaries with label support [29] where the label is not private but
is required for decryption. Suppose that the PKE has key pair (pk, sk) and Ext(X, S) is
computed using distributed variant of our doubly-affine extractors.
Enc(X, pk, M) = (EncPK(pk, S, M ′), M ′) with M ′ = M ⊕ Ext(X, S) and uniformly
random S.
Dec(X, sk, (S′, M ′)) = M ′ ⊕ Ext(X, DecPK(sk, S′, M ′)).
We formally define and prove security in our full version.
Computationally-Secure Keys. In the server setting, parties no longer need to meet and
share the secret key as they may generate shared randomness through the servers. We show
that two parties may utilize information-theoretic encryption schemes without meeting. First,
the two parties use key exchange to agree on a computationally-secure seed S. To encrypt a
message M , we may use any of the prior constructions where Ext(X, S) is computed using
the servers.
Malicious Servers. In this last section, we consider when the t − g corrupted servers
are malicious. Malicious servers are able to answer in an arbitrary manner including no
response, wrong responses and responses that are inconsistent across multiple requests. As an
example, malicious servers may ignore sampler seeds and return random bits for each request.
Therefore, malicious servers can force our extractor outputs to no longer be deterministic.
For two queries with the same seeds, the outputs might be different that will be problematic
for many applications.
In this section, we present a solution to this problem. The main modification is to utilize
Reed-Solomon codes to handle both errors (servers returning wrong responses) and erasures
(servers not returning any response). Using a Reed-Solomon code that adds z check bits, the
decoding algorithms may handle up to a errors and b erasures such that 2a + b ≤ ⌊z/2⌋. All
p sampled bits will be encoded using a Reed-Solomon code. If there are at t − g malicious
servers, that means at most (t − g)/t · p errors and/or erasures may occur in the sampled
bits. Therefore, we choose to use a Reed-Solomon code with z ≥ 2(t − g)/t · p check bits. In
applications, multiple parties will have to share both the same seeds as well as the z check
bits to guarantee the same output.
As the z check bits generated by the Reed-Solomon code must be shared between multiple
parties, we consider the z check bits to be public and, thus, available to the adversary. One
reason we chose to use Reed-Solomon code is that that check bits are linear in the message
and, thus, linear in the sampled bits. So, we may consider the leaked z check bits as general
linear leakage obtained by the adversary. This requires several modifications to DExt. Note
that our extractors require that the sampled bits from the g good servers have m + log(2/ε)
bits of residual entropy as the non-linear extractor will lose log(2/ε) bits of entropy. For
malicious server setting, the z check bits will be publicly released. Therefore, we need the
sampled bits from the good servers to have residual entropy of m + z + log(2/ε) bits as we
will lose z bits of entropy for the public check bits and another log(2/ε) from the non-linear
extractor. Additionally, at most t/3 of the servers may be malicious.
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Table 1 Numerical examples, comparison with [5]. Both tables consider 100 GB random
sources and ε = 2−64. The left table considers 10% leakage and the right table 50% leakage. The
leftmost columns denote the probe complexity p. The second and third column denote the number
























We now analyze the efficiency of our extractors in several dimensions. We compare our
extractors with those that appeared in previous works. The majority of previous works such
as [15, 30] focused on asymptotic as opposed to concrete efficiency. We focus on two recent
works that present concretely efficient (p, p)-local extractors [5] and (p, c)-local extractors [4].
We caveat that these extractors were built for general leakage as opposed to only linear
leakage like our extractors. Therefore, we expect our constructions to be more efficient.
Both [5] and [4] assume the existence of a random oracle. The random oracle is utilized for
both seed generation and non-local extraction. To make a fair comparison with our doubly-
affine extractors, we replace random oracles with our non-local extractor (see Theorem 10)
and require that the requisite seed length is provided as input. With these modifications,
our constructions have smaller or identical seed lengths. The (p, c)-local extractor of [4]
uses seeds of length p log(n/c) that is larger than our extractor’s seed length of c log(n/c)




seeds that are identical
to the ones used in [5]. We present numerical comparisons in Tables 1 and 2 verifying that
our extractors are more efficient. For our comparison, we use security parameter ε = 2−64.
In all settings, our constructions extract more bits compared to both previous works when
using the same probe and/or cache complexity.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we define the notion of doubly-affine extractors where both the output and
leakage must be affine. Using these two restrictions, we present a series of reductions showing
that optimal doubly-affine extractors end up being simple PPT algorithms that check
intersection of linear subspaces. Using these insights, we show that doubly-affine extractors
may tolerate post- application leakage and computational seeds, which are impossible in general
leakage models. We present extractor constructions that are almost concretely optimal in
terms of randomness usage, probe and cache complexity beating prior works. Finally,
we show that the doubly-affine restrictions are perfect for the application of information-
theoretic encryption. Using our concretely efficient extractors, we obtain state-of-the-art
information-theoretic encryption.
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Table 2 Numerical examples, comparison with [4]. Both tables consider 100 GB random
sources and ε = 2−64. The left table considers 10% leakage and the right table 50% leakage. The
leftmost column denotes the cache complexity c. The first row denotes the number of probed bits in
each of the c groups. The remaining entries denote the number of random bits extracted.
c 1 8 32 64 512
Ours [4] Ours [4] Ours [4] Ours [4] Ours [4]
250 53 53 885 524 3738 695 7542 723 60796 748
500 234 189 2334 1130 9532 1471 19129 1572 153488 1575
1000 622 463 5436 2343 21942 3024 43950 3134 352057 3229
5000 3690 2655 31237 12048 128746 15445 257558 15994 2060924 16464
10000 8263 5395 66565 24178 266455 30972 532976 32068 4264226 33008
c 1 8 32 64 512
Ours [4] Ours [4] Ours [4] Ours [4] Ours [4]
250 0 0 85 90 538 146 1142 157 9596 168
500 34 0 734 262 3132 374 6329 396 51088 417
1000 222 84 2236 608 9142 831 18350 874 147257 914
5000 1960 757 16137 3371 64746 4482 129558 4697 1036924 4892
10000 4263 1598 34565 6825 138455 9046 276976 9475 2216266 9864
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